Introduction
Large emerging economies, such as Brazil, China and India, are considered the markets of the future as promising destinations for sales as well as worrying origins of new tough competitors. At the same time, firms from those countries feel they are not able to compete on a level playing field with firms from more advanced economies due to all sorts of market failures. In particular, credit constraints are often perceived one of the most important market frictions constraining innovation, growth and performance as they hamper the entrepreneurial efforts of local firms. While huge amounts of public money are being devoted to the removal of such constraints, their effectiveness is still subject to an intense policy debate.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by investigating the case of Brazil. The Brazilian government provides long-term loans through the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (henceforth, BNDES), a development bank whose main statutory goal is to improve Brazilian economic competitiveness without neglecting broader social and environmental aspects. BNDES invests in several areas including research and development, infrastructure, export support, regional and urban development. More specifically, in the case of manufacturing, BNDES finances longterm projects aimed at the creation of new plants, the enlargement of existing ones, the restructuring and the modernization of production processes, innovation and technological development, export promotion. Overall, the importance of BNDES in the Brazilian economy is quite sizeable: in 2012 its disbursements reached the value of R$ 156 billion (or US$ 76 billion), representing 20% of aggregate investment. 1 Even though BNDES project analysis involves several dimensions including social and environmental aspects, this paper focuses on the assessment of the overall impact on the competitiveness of Brazilian firms. Do BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that hamper the innovativeness and productivity of Brazilian firms? We address this question by analysing micro-data drawn from a variety of sources: the alternative 'treatment' and 'control' groups that one can use to assess the impact of BNDES support. Credit constraints are investigated in Section 5, while Section 6 looks at the impact of BNDES support on firm performance. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical framework
Consider a firm that has a portfolio of projects and has to decide which projects to implement. Projects differ in terms of efficiency φ>0 and their implementation generates imperfectly substitutable outputs.
The firm faces a perceived demand for the output of any of its projects with constant price elasticity equal to σ>1 such that
where q is quantity demanded, p is price, and A is aggregate demand, which the firm takes as given. A project can be implemented only after incurring a fixed investment cost. Production also faces a constant marginal cost, which depends on the efficiency of the project and the type of technology adopted for production. There are two types of technologies available, 'old' and 'new', and they differ in terms of both fixed and marginal costs. Specifically, the old technology requires a smaller initial investment but is also less effective: its fixed cost is lower but, for a given level of project efficiency, its marginal cost is higher. All this is captured by total cost
where f T is the fixed investment cost and c T/ φ is the marginal production cost. All the rest given, higher project efficiency (larger φ) maps into lower marginal cost (higher 'productivity'). T is an index of technology, which equals N and S in the case of new and old technologies respectively. Hence, we have f N >f S and c N <c S . Profit maximization with constant demand elasticity requires the firm to set its price for the output of a project with efficiency φ as a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
This price then determines output, revenue and profit as:
As σ is larger than one, results (3) and (4) show that, for a given technology, a more efficient project leads to lower price, larger output, larger revenue and larger profit. As the firm chooses the technology that generates more profit net of fixed cost, higher project efficiency, therefore, fosters its adoption. Moreover, as the fixed cost is higher for the new technology, higher project efficiency also fosters implementation through the new technology.
Specifically, there are two threshold efficiency levels, φ S and φ N (with φ N >φ S ), that determine whether the project is implement or not and, if implemented, which technology is adopted. For efficiency below φ S , neither the old technology nor the new technology break even as output from the project is too small to cover the fixed investment cost. For efficiency above φ N , output is large enough not only to cover the fixed investment cost of the old technology but also to fruitfully exploit the new technology notwithstanding its larger fixed investment cost. For efficiency between φ S and φ N , output is still large enough to offset the fixed investment cost of the old technology but not large enough to cover the larger fixed investment cost of the new technology. Hence, projects with φ<φ S are not implemented; project with φ>φ N are implemented through the new technology; projects with φ S <φ<φ N are implemented through the old technology.
Formally, φ S is such that 0 ) ( 
S S  
: for φ=φ S the firm is indifferent between implementing and not implementing the project. Using (4), this cutoff for project implementation is : for φ=φ N the firm is indifferent between the two technologies. Using again (4), we have
which is assumed to hold so that the new technology does not always dominate the old technology whenever the firm decides to implement the project.
Credit constraints on the implementation of projects and the adoption of technologies can be introduced in this framework by assuming that they increase the costs of the required initial investments. Vice versa, interventions that relax credit constraints can be thought of as implying smaller fixed investment costs f S and f N . Inspecting (5) and (6) reveals that smaller f S and f N reduce both φ S and φ N , thus increasing the share of projects that are implemented. As for technology adoption, credit constraints may affect the two fixed investment costs asymmetrically. For instance, if they affected disproportionately the adoption of the new technology, their relaxation would decrease f N more than f S , increasing the relative number of projects implemented through the more efficient new technology and thus improving firm productivity. On the contrary, if credit constraints affected disproportionately the adoption of the old technology, their relaxation would decrease f S more than f N , increasing the relative number of projects implemented through the less efficient old technology and thus reducing firm productivity. Finally, if credit constraints for both technologies were reduced proportionately, some projects would be implemented adopting the new technology while others would be implemented adopting the old technology with ambiguous effects on firm productivity.
To summarize, our theoretical framework implies that, if BNDES loans relaxed the credit constraints faced by Brazilian firms, this would map into more projects being implemented. However, the implementation of more projects would eventually lead to higher firm productivity only if projects were implemented mainly using new technologies rather than old ones.
Overview of BNDES schemes
BNDES provides a wide range of financial tools to support Brazilian manufacturing firms: FINEM, Automatic BNDES, FINAME, Leasing FINAME, International Competition FINAME (BNDES-Exim) and Subscription of Securities.
FINEM ("Financing and Endeavours") is a direct or indirect support scheme for projects with financial needs over R$10 million (equivalent to US$ 5.7 million). Projects with financial needs below this threshold are instead supported solely indirectly through retailing banks under the Automatic BNDES scheme. Both schemes contemplate several categories of expenses covering the creation of new plants, the enlargement of existing ones, the restructuring and the modernization of processes, innovation, and technological development. Through the FINAME ("Machines and Equipment") and the Leasing FINAME schemes, BNDES supports the acquisition of new domestically produced machines and equipment either buying them (FINAME) or leasing them (Leasing FINAME). Finally, the aim of BNDES-Exim is to provide financial support for exports while the aim of Subscription of Securities is to facilitate changes in firm ownership.
Our focus is on FINEM and Automatic BNDES as they are more focused on supporting the discovery and the implementation of promising projects. Differently, FINAME and Leasing FINAME do not contemplate investments in innovation and technological development. Nonetheless, it is necessary to account for them in order to isolate the role of FINEM and Automatic BNDES. BNDES-Exim and Subscription of Securities have, instead, rather different objectives.
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FINEM and Automatic BNDES are therefore loans that have stronger potential to directly affect firms' productivity since their expansion may be guided by improvements in production and/or creation of new and/or more sophisticated goods.
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In order to receive any of these two loans, either FINEM or Automatic BNDES, firms need to send a supporting application form with some brief information of their projects to a retailing bank or BNDES itself. The banks evaluate whether their projects are in line with the purpose of the mentioned loans. After getting their application approved, firms have to send complete and detailed project plans to be evaluated by the financial institutions. These project plans are evaluated in terms of whether they are economically viable, what collateral can be used to guarantee the loan, and so forth.
If successful, the evaluation process culminates in a formal contract proposal where the terms and conditions of the loan are established, including amount, period, and interest rate. After negotiations have finished, the loan contract is signed. It is important to note two crucial points here. First, there is a limit for BNDES participation in any project. This varies over time but is generally around 80%. A project is thus never fully financed by BNDES. Second, firms receive their loan in instalments according to the development of the project and following a schedule decided during negotiation.
In particular, firms receive the first instalment when the loan is approved and the remaining ones only after an evaluation of the project's progress. Before the second instalment, the firm should prove whether the money of the first disbursement was invested as dictated by the project plan. Any violation of the loan terms leads to a further investigation and instalments are interrupted until justifications are given. If no problems emerge, instalments continue until the end of the project. Since these are longterm projects, the period between contract signing and the end of instalments takes on average 5 years. Generally, only after all instalments have been paid, firms start to amortize their loans.
Treatment and control groups
Do FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that hamper the competitiveness of Brazilian firms? Answering this question requires, first of all, identifying the group of granted ('treated') firms for which enough information is available. Then, it is crucial to define a 'valid' counterfactual highlighting what would have happened to the granted firms had they not be supported by BNDES. Compared to the counterfactual, one has to establish whether firms granted BNDES loans were indeed credit constrained, and then check whether their performance actually changed after receiving the BNDES loans. Checking that they have implemented their projects is, instead, redundant given that, as already discussed, BNDES funds are transferred to firms in instalments and, except for the first one, these are made conditional on firms having successfully followed the agreed implementation plan.
The analysis relies on micro-data drawn from a variety of sources already used by the papers described by Coelho and Sousa (2010 
Treated groups
We select out group of 'treated' firms as follows. First, we use BNDES data to identify granted firms from 1995 to 2007. 8 During this period, 9,828 firms were 'treated' in that they received at least once one of the two targeted BNDES financial schemes (FINEM and/or Automatic BNDES schemes). These firms represent nearly 4% of all manufacturing firms in Brazil. Second, it is unfortunately impossible to use all these manufacturers as some of them are not available from PIA, especially small firms. The reason is that PIA covers only around 30,000 firms with more than 30 employees. These firms represent only 11% of all manufacturers but around 2/3 of overall manufacturing employment. 10 Hence, the fact that we have to focus only on PIA firms reduces the number of firms granted Automatic BNDES in our sample by half. Third, the size of the 'treated' group is further reduced because we want to evaluate only the performance of manufacturing firms granted loans to implement projects in the manufacturing sector. BNDES records, however, concern all manufacturing projects. They thus report also manufacturing projects by non-manufacturing firms (e.g., those of large food retailers investing in the development of their own brands) and do not cover non-manufacturing projects of manufacturing firms (e.g., those implemented in agriculture). Fourth, some firms appear or disappear from records due to mergers. For example, if Firm A received a loan in 1997 and in 2000 merged with Firm B creating a new Firm C, the initial loan should be registered for firm C. As the past records of Firm C are impossible to reconstruct, we drop all information on loans projects granted to firms like A and B.
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Finally, there is a time lag of generally two to three years before a firm enters the Census part of PIA.
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Hence, some granted firms with more than 30 employees are not recorded by PIA at the moment they receive BNDES loans.
Further issues potentially affect the size our 'treated' group. Some firms are exposed to other government interventions apart from BNDES loans. Since BNDES is the largest financial institution in Brazil offering loans for long-term projects, we imply assume that its loans are the main type of policy tools affecting firms' productivity. In addition, there may be a time lag for any impact to be detected, since outcomes do not necessarily appear immediately after the loan has been granted. As some projects last at least five years, we need a period beyond the five-year horizon to assess their impacts. Given the time spanned by our dataset (1996 to 2006) , that is clearly not feasible for loans granted from 1999 onwards. On the other hand, as we will discuss later, to construct the 'control' group for firms treated in a certain year, one needs at least two years before treatment. Hence, the impact of BNDES schemes can be scrutinized only for firms granted Automatic BNDES and FINEM loans in 1998. Excluding all firms treated before 1998 leaves us with 227 firms. Among these, 86 firms are not present in PIA dataset for the whole period investigated.
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In the end, the 'treated' group consists thus of 141 firms.
Lastly, it may be useful to distinguish among three 'treated' groups. Group I comprises all our 141 firms. To see whether there is any differential impacts between FINEM and Automatic BNDES, Group II consists only of firms receiving Automatic BNDES. To investigate the effects of repeated treatment, Group III considers only firms that are awarded BNDES support only in 1998 and not after. This summarized in Table  1. 14 <Place Table 1 here> 10 Firms with less than 30 employees are also considered in this survey, but they are selected randomly for the survey each year. Since their sample varies annually, and is thus impossible to follow, we have decided to discard them. 11 All firms that have received financial support through Subscription of Securities are deleted from our sample. 12 IBGE receives information of firms' size (number of employees) for a particular year only at the end of the following year. 13 There are three possible explanations for why a firm leaves the PIA dataset: first, it goes bankrupt; second, its employment level falls short of the threshold of 30 employees; third, the main part of its revenue does not come anymore from manufacturing. 14 We have also investigated different treated groups (such as firms financed through Automatic BNDES only in 1998 or all firms financed in 1998 regardless of their survival rate), but results were similar to those presented for the chosen three treated groups.
Control groups
How can we build a 'valid' counterfactual for the selected groups of 'treated' firms? Short of natural experiments or randomized control trials, the answer is not straightforward and we try various alternatives.
Unobservable characteristics
As a first alternative we use our judgement to identify 'control' groups that are likely to share similar unobservable characteristics with the 'treated' ones. The first 'control' Group A consists of all 21,380 Brazilian firms (above 30 employees) that do not receive any BNDES loans during the period of analysis. Firms, however, are not randomly selected by BNDES. Ideally one would like to compare granted to nongranted, yet eligible, firms. As granted firms are among those interested in making investments, Group B consists of all non-granted firms that during the investigated period have invested and survived. There are 6,344 such firms. Vice versa, as granted firms are assumed to be credit constrained, another control group should include nongranted firms that might have invested if they have had access to credit. Since our treated group comprehends firms granted loans in 1998, control Group C comprises firms that have not invested before 1998. There are 1,124 such firms. Lastly, Group D is composed by firms that have received BNDES loans but not during the investigated period as also these firms may be similar to those granted. Given that the information we use to test whether BNDES financial support has any impact begins in 1996 and ends in 2006, we place in Group D all firms granted in 2007 for the first time. Table 2 gives a summary of the main characteristics of treated and non-treated firms before BNDES intervention.
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First, credit constraints seem indeed to be stricter for 'treated' than 'non-treated' firms: whereas cash flow over capital is lower for the former than the latter, the reverse holds for the investment rate (investment over capital). While this is consistent with 'treated' firms facing stricter constraints, it may also be due to the fact that granted firms are more present in riskier sectors, as evidenced by the OECD technological classification.
<Place Table 2 here> Turning to performance, on average treated firms are larger and tend to exhibit higher productivity. This is so in terms of both total factor productivity (TFP) and labour productivity (value added per worker), though the difference is more pronounced for the latter.
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While the labour productivity of firms granted for the first time in 1998 (Group I) is more than 30% higher than that of non-granted firms that survived and invested (Group B), the TFP of the former is only 3% higher than that of the latter. Compared to the period before treatment, both measures of productivity grow faster for treated than non-treated firms.
Observable characteristics
So far we have proposed 'control' groups based on their likely similarity with the 'treated' ones with respect to unobservable characteristics. Alternatively, we can try to minimize the differences between 'treated' and 'control' groups in terms of observable characteristics. In so doing we use one-to-one Propensity Score Matching (PSM).
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This method creates a counterfactual group by pairing each granted firm with a similar non-granted one. Treated firms that cannot be paired with any non-granted firm are discarded.
In our case matching is based on pre-treatment observable characteristics that can be considered as relevant for firms to be eligible for support. In principle, these characteristics should include both dynamic performance indicators (e.g. revenue growth) and static performance indicators (e.g. size) as well as financial information (e.g. availability of collateral).
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To pin down the subset of characteristics that are indeed relevant, we use a Probit model in which the outcome is the ex-ante probability of receiving financial support from BNDES. We then pair granted and non-granted firms with similar ex-ante probability of being funded. We start looking for matches at the seventh decimal digit of probability. For unmatched firms we gradually relax the requirement until the second decimal digit.
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Granted firms that at that point cannot find a non-granted match are dropped.
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Considering only non-granted firms that invest and survive during our period of analysis (6,344 firms), we find three different 'control' groups depending on each 'treated' group. A summary of how many firms are matched is shown in Table 3 . More than 80% of treated firms find their non-treated 'twin'.
<Place Table 3 here>   Table 4 illustrates the extent to which matched pairs are similar in terms of the observable characteristics. It reports averages for these characteristics as well as the tstatistics and p-values for the test of mean difference between matched pairs. 21 <Place Table 4 here> Generally, it is possible to observe that treated and non-treated firms are much more alike in Table 4 than in Table 2 . At the 5% level of significance, nearly all averages do not exhibit any statistically difference. Most notably, although some observable characteristics are not considered in our Probit model since they are not eligibility criteria for BNDES support, matched firms are similar even with respect to those characteristics. An important example is productivity: matched firms exhibit similar productivity levels before treatment even though productivity is not used to match them.
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Now that we have identified the 'treatment' and 'control' groups we can check first whether granted firms are indeed credit constrained before receiving BNDES support, and then whether their performance improves after receiving BNDES support.
17 See Arnold and Javornik (2005) who use PSM to evaluate the impact of foreign investment on firm productivity in Indonesia. 18 More details of each variable are available in Appendix III. 19 If no matches are found until second decimal digit, the treated firm is considered "not matched". 20 More information on PSM results are presented in Appendix III. 21 It is important to notice that for performing the Probit model, all continuous variables are in logs, where averages reported in Table 5 as well as test of means are in levels. Additionally, for parsimony, we are presenting only results related to Group 1. Results using the other three groups are presented in the Appendix III. 22 Not only previous productivity measures (either labour or TFP) are not considered as eligible criteria when BNDES analyses a project, but also previous investment level and cash flow over capital. All those measures are not included in our Probit model used to match treated and non-treated firms.
Were granted firms credit constrained before 'treatment'?
Credit constraints can be investigated in the wake of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and recent related works by Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) , Guariglia (2008) and Guariglia, Liu and Song (2011) . These works measure credit constraints by looking at the correlation between firms' investment and cash flows. The idea we already used to comment on Table 2 is that, when firms are credit constrained, investment has to rely on own liquidity leading to a positive correlation between investment and cash flow.
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This idea can be implemented through the following regression:
where i identifies the firm and t denotes time, Inv it is the level of investment, K it-1 is the capital stock, CashFlow it is the amount of cash flow generated, BNDES i is a dummy for 'treated' firms granted a loan in 1998 (treated Group I), X it is a set of controls and ε it is the error term. As the capital stock is lagged in time, this specification requires twoperiod information and, as our treated group comprehends 1998 granted firms, we are restricted to use information from 1996 and 1997. We are thus able to estimate this specification only with OLS in the cross section. In order to eliminate as much as possible firms' specific characteristics, we introduce different sets of dummies, including OCDE technological classification, size, region and multinational status, as well as current and lagged sales over capital. For investment opportunities, we have followed the literature by including sectoral value added variation and investment. The parameter of interest is α. A significant positive estimate would mean that, before receiving BNDES support in 1998, granted firms faced indeed stricter credit constraints than non-granted firms. Table 5 reports the estimation results for equation (7). Columns correspond to the different counterfactuals. Since the coefficient of cash flow interacted with the BNDES dummy is positive and significant in all entries, the table shows that granted firms are indeed more credit constrained than most control groups before being awarded BNDES financial support. These findings are confirmed also in the case of 'treated' Groups II and III, except for the control group created through propensity score matching in which case paired non-granted firms do not seem to present softer credit constraints than granted firms. 24 <Place Table 5 here> 6. Do granted firms improve their performance after 'treatment'? After checking that, before accessing BNDES funds, granted firms faced more severe credit constraints than non-granted ones, we can now investigate whether BNDES support affected their subsequent performance. We do this through a difference-in-differences (DID) approach that allows us to eliminate any residual timeinvariant unobservable characteristic that is different between 'treated' and 'nontreated' firms. In particular, we adopt the specification in Bronzini and Blasio (2006) :
where it y is a productivity measure, BNDES i is a dummy variable indicating granted firms in 1998, D t is a year dummy, POST t is a set of dummies for each year after the firm receives the loan, and X it is the vector of control variables. The parameter of interest is δ t , whose estimated value measures the impact of BNDES support on firm productivity over time. Note that the estimation of (8) allows us to assess not only whether BNDES support affects firm productivity but also when its impact eventually materializes. Table 6 present the estimation results using Group 1. Control groups are presented in increasing order of refinement: all existent firms; firms that invested and survived; firms that did not make any investments before 1998; firms that received their first BNDES support in 2007; pair firms through propensity scored matching. 25 Columns of each counterfactual group are divided into two types of productivity measures: labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) estimated following the procedure by Levinhson and Petrin (2003) . 26 <Place Table 6 here> As the TFP measure accounts for differences in capital stock among firms, the corresponding regressions do not feature investment in either domestic capital or imported capital as a covariate.
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These are, instead, included in the case of labour productivity. Interestingly, investment in imported capital and labour productivity are positively correlated while no clear cut correlation appears in the case of domestic capital. This may suggest that imported capital goods are technologically more advanced.
As for our parameter of interest, in the case of labour productivity results are mixed depending on control groups. In our less refined control groups (Groups A, B and C), we find a positive impact of BNDES support on labour productivity until 2004 and no effect afterwards, suggesting that it improves the relative performance of granted firms for seven years. However, this does not happen when we consider the remaining more refined control groups (Groups D and E). Compared to these groups, 'treated' firms do not perform any different. On the other hand, results are not mixed in the case of TFP, in which no effect of BNDES support is detected in the first years after 'treated' firms are granted whatever compassion group is considered. From 2003, BNDES financial support impacts negatively granted firms when compared to those in control Groups A and C. However, this does not happen for the other three control groups (Group B, D and E). Overall, we find little ground to conclude that BNDES support has any robust effect on granted firms' productivity in our sample. 28 25 It is important to mention that all control groups, apart from "All Firms", consider only firms that survived during the whole period investigated. For instance, firms that did not invest until 1997 survived from 1996 to 2006. 26 Results with all controls as well as for treated groups II and III are available in Appendix V. Taking into consideration only Automatic BNDES schemes or firms financed only once in 1998 gives similar results. In other words, using different 'treated' groups leads to similar conclusions. 27 We have included them but results remained qualitatively similar. 28 Our findings are not an isolated case in the literature. For example, Criscuolo et al (2007) investigated the effect on industrial policy in the UK. Their results show no significant impact on firms' productivity, even though there are effects on employment and investment. Similar outcomes are also found by Ottaviano and Sousa (2008) and Sousa (2013) who investigating the same BNDES schemes through different empirical strategies.
Concluding remarks
Do FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that hamper the competitiveness of Brazilian firms? We have addressed this question by comparing granted and non-granted firms. It has been crucial to identify a 'valid' counterfactual highlighting what would have happened to the granted firms had they not been supported by BNDES. Compared to the counterfactual, we have checked whether firms granted BNDES loans were indeed credit constrained, and then whether their performance actually changed after receiving BNDES loans.
Overall, granted firms appear to have been more credit constrained than comparable non-granted firms before receiving BNDES support. Moreover, it seems that such support has allowed the selected sample of granted firms to achieve the same level of performance as similar firms that were not credit constrained, but not to outperform them.
While this is already some achievement, a positive differential impact on the performance of granted firms could be achieved through a more pro-active role of BNDES in helping these firms select their projects. We have used a simple theoretical framework to show that, if some projects are implemented through new technologies and others through old ones, the net effect on firm productivity might be null. If BNDES wanted to further improve the competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturers, more emphasis should be given to projects using new technologies. As most of the BNDES loans are selected by the retailing banking system, targeting innovative technologies may require rethinking the instructions given by BNDES to banks. . From this year on, each firm's capital stock is generated using its initial capital stock, its investments and depreciation. c) Input -The PIA dataset reports firm input expenditure. d) Output -We use the total value of production as our measure of production e) Energy -The PIA dataset reports firm energy expenditure.
Appendix I: List of Variables
The results of the TFP estimation are the following:
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